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  In the past two decades, developing countries have significantly increased both 
their export orientation and the proportion of their exports that consists of manufactured 
goods.
1 These shifts have been driven by several motivations, including the perceived 
inefficiencies of inward-oriented, import-substitution industrialization, a desire to avoid 
the historically recurring problem of falling terms of trade for primary commodities and a 
belief that manufactures offer superior long-run development prospects compared to 
primary commodities. The increasing reliance on manufactured export-oriented growth 
strategies has had some stunning successes, particularly in the so-called ‘four tigers’ 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) in the 1970s and 1980s and China in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, for a large number of countries that have sought 
to join on this bandwagon, the results have been disappointing. While a small group of 
East Asian nations have used manufactured exports to propel themselves into a process of 
convergence with the industrialized economies of the global ‘North’, most of the 
countries in the ‘South’ that have specialized in manufactured exports over the past two 
decades have not achieved similar success. 
  The uneven growth performance of the developing countries most specialized in 
manufactured exports in the past three decades is shown in Table 1. The growth of the 
four tigers (‘newly industrialized Asian economies’), which averaged 7.7 percent per year 
in the 1980s, slowed down in the 1990s and 2000s, when many other developing 
countries began to enter the market for manufactured exports. China grew at rates of 
about 10 percent per year throughout all the periods shown, and India accelerated to 7.7   2
percent in 2000-7. However, the twelve other emerging and developing economies 
specialized in manufactures increased their average growth rates only marginally (from 
3.8 percent in 1980-89 to 4.5 percent in 2000-7) in spite of the fact that many of them 
were plagued by the debt crisis in the 1980s, and never came close to the earlier rapid 
growth of the four tigers or the more recent success of China and India. Between 2000 
and 2007, these twelve economies actually grew more slowly than the average for all 
emerging and developing economies (6.4 percent) as the countries that were specialized 
in primary commodities benefited from the commodity price boom during that period. 
[Table 1 about here] 
  Undoubtedly, many factors impact on countries’ growth rates and domestic 
policies contribute to the success or failure of export-led growth strategies. Nevertheless, 
the inability of so many countries to fully emulate the rapid export-led growth of the East 
Asian countries and to withstand growing Chinese competition raises the possibility of 
what has come to be known as the ‘fallacy of composition’, that is, an adding-up 
constraint on the efforts of numerous developing countries to simultaneously export 
similar types of manufactured goods to the same industrialized country markets. In 
theory, the exporting nations need not face demand-side constraints, under certain 
optimistic conditions: (1) the industrialized countries grow rapidly enough to 
accommodate increasing volumes of developing country exports of manufactures without 
depressing the prices of those goods (or alternatively, the income elasticity of demand for 
developing country exports is very high); (2) the developing nations provide increasing 
amounts of reciprocal demand for each other’s exports via ‘South-South’ trade to relieve 
the constraints emanating from limitations on industrialized countries’ demand; or (3) the   3
developing countries as a group move in a ‘flying geese formation’ in which the 
relatively more advanced ones move on to more capital-intensive and technologically 
sophisticated products, thereby making room for new entrants exporting more labor-
intensive, standardized products. Although there is some evidence for conditions (2) and 
(3) holding for certain countries in some time periods, there is little evidence for 
condition (1). Furthermore, a growing body of research suggests that these optimistic 
conditions do not hold generally and, as a result, most developing country exporters of 
manufactures are subject to significant demand-side constraints arising from their 
competition over the same export markets in similar products. The rest of this chapter 




Many of the arguments in favor of manufacturing export-led growth have implicitly 
assumed a ‘small country’ paradigm, in which each country’s exports can increase 
without quantitative limit and without putting downward pressure on their prices. These 
arguments do not consider what happens if a large number of developing countries 
pursue export-led growth by targeting the same industrialized country markets 
simultaneously. In other words, what are the consequences when a large number of small 
countries add up and essentially act as a ‘large country’ in the global market for 
manufactured exports? Studies that have addressed this issue can be divided into two 
broad groups and several sub-categories.
2 In the broadest terms, the two main types of 
studies are those that have tested for negative effects of intra-developing competition on   4
export performance and those that have examined the impact of that competition on 
growth rates. We shall consider each group briefly in turn. 
  The literature that has focused on exports contains three main branches: (1) 
studies of quantitative crowding-out or displacement; (2) studies of negative effects on 
prices of manufactured exports; and (3) studies of price competition limiting export 
growth among the developing countries. Empirical studies of quantitative displacement 
began with the pioneering work of Cline (1982), who suggested that it would be difficult 
for very many countries to emulate the success of the four tigers from the 1970s. Blecker 
(2002) and Palley (2003) found evidence of crowding out of imports from certain 
countries in the US market in certain periods, but did not study global competition or 
control for other variables. More recently, several studies (for example, Eichengreen, et 
al., 2007) have sought to identify the effects of China’s entry in the global economy on 
the exports of other developing countries (including exporters of primary commodities, 
who generally benefit, as well as exporters of manufactures, who tend to lose). Razmi 
(2007b) improved on the earlier econometric studies of the displacement hypothesis by 
controlling for exchange rates and total demand, and his work is summarized below. 
  With regard to negative price effects, Kaplinsky (1993, 1999) has suggested that 
many manufactured export products have become ‘commoditized’ and now behave more 
like primary commodities in the sense that they are prone to suffer declining terms of 
trade when exported in increasing volumes. He also suggests that the need to compete via 
low prices pressures developing countries to suppress real wages and devalue their 
currencies, thereby limiting the income gains from exports. Evidence about trends in the 
terms of trade for developing country exports of manufactures is mixed overall, but using   5
disaggregated EU import data Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino (2006) have found that less 
technologically advanced exports from lower-income countries are falling in relative 
price. US import data show a general decline in the relative price of imports of all 
manufactured goods from developing countries compared with manufactured imports 
from industrialized countries from 1991-2007, and this is just as true for the East Asian 
newly industrializing countries as it is for all developing countries (see Figure 1).
3  
[Figure 1 about here] 
  Turning to price effects on export demand, Faini et al. (1992) and Muscatelli et al. 
(1994) were the first to identify significant price-substitution effects in competition 
among developing nations for manufactured export markets in the industrialized 
countries. While these studies estimated export demand functions for individual 
developing nations, Razmi and Blecker (2008)—in addition to providing estimates for 
individual countries using more recent data and better price indexes—also tested for 
overall price competition effects using panel data methods. Dividing their sample of 18 
countries into panels of low- and high-technology exporters, they found that price 
competition was more significant among the low technology exporters while the income 
elasticity of export demand was higher for the high-technology exporters. An updated 
version of these results is presented below. 
  Turning to the second broad group, only a small number of recent studies have 
tested for growth or output impacts of competition among developing countries for export 
markets. These studies have mainly focused on whether relative prices or real exchange 
rates of developing country exporters of manufactures have a significant impact on their 
overall macroeconomic performance. Before discussing this empirical research, a brief   6
summary of the underlying theoretical issues is in order. Traditionally, mainstream 
macroeconomics has downplayed the role of the real exchange rate as a policy 
instrument, considering it to be a variable whose equilibrium value is given at a point in 
time by factors such as technology, factor endowments and tastes. Any temporary 
deviations are counteracted by the tendency of relative prices of tradables to move 
towards maintaining (absolute or relative) purchasing power parity. Classical neutrality 
of money allegedly ensures the insulation of real variables from changes in their nominal 
values beyond the short run.  
  Many development economists have also often taken a skeptical view of the 
utility of the real exchange as a development tool, although on different grounds. 
Traditionally, developing countries were categorized as exporters of primary 
commodities and agricultural products, the demand for which is relatively price-inelastic. 
The nonsatisfaction of the Marshall-Lerner condition implies that exchange rate 
devaluations could result in undesirable and destabilizing consequences.
4 Considering 
that manufactures now constitute the largest share of exports from developing countries 
as a whole, this concern has become of less importance. Indeed, given the increasing 
competition amongst developing country manufacturers, one might expect to see 
relatively high cross-price elasticities of demand for such products. 
  The Post Keynesian balance-of-payments-constrained growth (BPCG) model 
provides a convenient theoretical framework for thinking about demand-side constraints 
on export-led growth.
5 However, the original BPCG model assumed that each individual 
country’s export performance was independent of other countries’ exports, and it also 
assumed that demand was relatively price-inelastic (or else that purchasing power parity   7
prevented relative prices from changing in the long run). Blecker (2002) addressed the 
first problem by synthesizing the ‘almost ideal demand system’ (AIDS) developed by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) with the BPCG framework to create a model in which 
relative price changes among a large number of countries can affect the output growth 
rates of the exporting nations, on the assumption that their growth is constrained by the 
requirement of maintaining balanced trade. The AIDS specification allows for the 
incorporation of an adding-up constraint on the growth of exports from a group of 
countries that compete for shares in the same industrialized country markets. Since the 
growth of exports places a constraint on output growth in the BPCG framework, an 
adding-up constraint on export growth, in turn, translates into an adding-up constraint on 
output growth. Blecker also dropped the assumption that relative price (real exchange 
rate) effects are negligible, especially when considering competition by countries 
exporting similar products to the same markets. Subsequently, Razmi (2004) extended 
Blecker’s model to incorporate capital flows. The presence of capital flows (thus relaxing 
the assumption of balanced trade) and the focus on relative price changes render the 
model more suitable for application to short-run changes in output.
6 
  Recent empirical work has generated a fair amount of evidence that the real 
exchange rate does, in fact, play a significant role in influencing output growth. This, 
along with the refusal of China to let its currency rapidly appreciate or freely float—
presumably on the grounds that it will harm China’s investment- and export-led growth 
strategy—has led to a renewed interest in the role of the exchange rate as a development 
policy tool. In a comprehensive study that identifies more than 80 episodes of sustained 
growth since the 1950s (that is, growth spurts that lasted more than eight years),   8
Hausmann et al. (2005) find few statistically significant economic indicators of growth 
accelerations. They do, however, find that depreciated real exchange rates are robust 
correlates of such episodes. Similarly, using econometric techniques to identify structural 
breaks in growth paths, Berg et al. (2008) find that competitive exchange rates are one of 
the few factors that are robustly correlated with prolonged growth spells.  
 Levi-Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger (2007) hypothesize a ‘fear of appreciation’, as 
opposed to the ‘fear of floating’ originally suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
While the latter term was coined to refer to the fear of dramatic depreciations preceding 
or during currency crises, Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger argue that the rapid growth of 
foreign exchange reserves in developing countries reflects a fear of floating in reverse, 
which leads them to (successfully) intervene in foreign exchange markets to maintain a 
depreciated real exchange rate. Furthermore, these authors explore the relationship 
between real exchange changes and growth econometrically, finding that undervaluation 
is correlated with faster employment and output growth. Notably, the positive 
relationship appears to go beyond short-term cyclical changes to long-run growth. 
However, the boost to long-run growth seems not to work through greater export volumes 
or import substitution, but rather through greater investment and savings. 
  Polterovich and Popov (2002) find that the accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves contributes to developing country economic growth.
7 Moreover, the reported 
estimates suggest that only reserve accumulation under positive external balances (as 
opposed to reserves following from foreign borrowing) result in beneficial 
undervaluation of the exchange rate. They explain these results partly by hypothesizing 
that the accumulation of reserves leads to exchange rate undervaluation, which in turn   9
results in external surpluses, higher investment and savings, and export-led growth. Razin 
and Collins (1997) found that low-to-moderate real exchange rate undervaluations are 
correlated with accelerated growth. The relationship displays important nonlinearities, 
however. For example, large undervaluations are not associated with more rapid growth.
8 
  While this emerging body of literature has renewed interest in the phenomenon of 
real exchange rate management, it does not distinguish between real exchange rate 
changes relative to other industrialized countries versus those relative to other developing 
countries. Blecker and Razmi (2008) addressed this problem by constructing separate real 
exchange rate indexes for each developing country exporter in their sample relative to (a) 
the industrialized countries’ currencies and (b) the currencies of rival developing country 
exporters.
9 Using panel data methods, they found that real depreciations relative to the 
industrialized countries generally have contractionary effects—as hypothesized in the 
large literature on ‘contractionary devaluations’
10—but that real depreciations relative to 
competing developing countries generally have expansionary effects on output growth. 
These results, which differ in some subtle respects between different groups of 
developing country exporters, are summarized below.  
 
Empirical hypotheses and econometric results 
 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, there are a number of ways of specifying the 
fallacy of composition (FOC) hypothesis that have different empirical implications. In 
this section, we consider three specific FOC hypotheses and corresponding econometric 
tests.
11 The three hypotheses are:   10
•  FOC-quantity: This is the simplest version of FOC, which is the idea of quantitative 
displacement or crowding-out of the exports of some developing countries by exports 
from other developing countries. 
•  FOC-price: This refers to intra-developing country price competition over export 
markets in the industrialized countries, which is usually tested by estimating export 
demand functions for developing country exports of manufactures. 
•  FOC-growth: This refers to positive output or growth effects of real depreciations 
(lower relative prices of exports) with respect to rival developing countries competing 
in the same industrialized country markets. This is the strongest version of FOC, 
which is motivated by the theoretical model of Blecker (2002) and Razmi (2004) 
discussed earlier. 
  In the remainder of this section, we discuss the econometric models used to test 
each of these hypotheses and the results thereof in turn. In all cases, we define 
manufactures as consisting of products falling under standard international trade 
classification (SITC) categories 5 (chemicals and related products), 6 (manufactured 
goods classified chiefly by material (including rubber, textiles, iron and steel), 7 
(machinery and transport equipment (including telecommunications, electrical, 
computers, other electronics and automobiles) and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured 
articles including furniture, apparel, footwear and instruments), excluding category 68 
(non-ferrous metals). In all of the econometric estimates presented below, endogeneity 
issues are addressed by using the General Method of Moments (GMM) approach, which 
utilizes the lagged values of the dependent and independent variables as instruments. 
   11
Crowding out (FOC-quantity) 
  The most basic idea of FOC is the notion that exports of manufactures from one 
developing country can be crowded out or displaced by the growth of similar exports 
from competing developing countries. If this is true, then the quantity of one country’s 
manufactured exports should be inversely related to the quantity of other developing 
countries’ exports, after controlling for relative price and income effects. One advantage 
of pursuing this quantitative approach is that the quantitative data, unlike the price data, 
are available at more disaggregated levels, allowing us to explore the presence of 
crowding out effects down to the two-digit SITC level.  
  To test this hypothesis, we specify the following empirical model:
12 






it it e X a R a Z a a X + + + + = 3 2 1 0      ( 1 )  
where Xit is the volume of exports of manufactured goods from country i at time t, 
N
it Z  is 
total real expenditures on imports of manufactured goods by the industrialized countries, 
N
it R  =  it
N
it P P /  is the relative price of domestically produced manufactured goods in the 
industrialized countries (measured by the index
N
it P ) to country i’s own export price index 
(Pit), 
L
it X  is an index of the volume of exports from other developing countries that 
compete with exports from each country i and eit is the error term. The FOC-quantity or 
quantitative displacement hypothesis implies a3 < 0. 
[Table 2 about here] 
  Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating equation (1) for the period 1984-
2004 using a sample of 22 developing countries and 13 industrialized countries, with all 
data measured in natural logarithms.
13 In estimating equation (1), we used an 
autoregressive distributed lag specification with one lag each of the dependent and   12
independent variables, i.e., ARDL (1,1). The long-run coefficients reported in Table 2 
were derived by dividing the sum of the current and lagged coefficients for each variable 
by one minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. The results in the first 
column (for the ‘ALL’ panel) show evidence of crowding out at the aggregated level 
including all developing countries in the sample. The estimates for the other panels, 
which are disaggregated by industry (SITC categories), suggest that displacement effects 
(negative coefficients on X
L) are strongest in categories 6, 8 and associated sub-
categories, but they are also found in category 7, which includes some of the products 
that, due to their relatively high-tech nature, have traditionally been considered to be 
relatively immune to cut-throat competition. This may be explained by two factors. First, 
the term ‘high-tech’ may be misleading as a substantial proportion of the production 
falling under these categories consists of labor-intensive assembly operations requiring 
relatively few skills and exhibiting relatively low barriers to entry. Second, and on a 
related note, a number of developing countries have established a presence in the sectors 
classified under SITC 7, owing in no small measure to the vertical disintegration of 
global production processes.
14 Thus, some of the SITC categories traditionally seen as 
relatively high-tech may not be immune to what Kaplinsky (1993) has called the 
commoditization of manufactures. 
  Alternative estimates of this model, which are not shown here for reasons of 
space,
15 yield additional insights into where and when the greatest displacement effects 
are found. Dividing the industrialized countries into three blocs—the US, EU and 
Japan—reveals that crowding out effects are significant only in the US market, which is 
also the largest destination. Splitting the sample period into two halves shows that the   13
crowding out coefficient is statistically significant only for the second half of the sample 
period, 1994-2004. Notably, this period includes the formation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the rise 
of China as a major exporting power (as well as China’s accession to the WTO in 2001). 
Furthermore, the results suggest the presence of a ‘China effect’ in the sense that the 
crowding out coefficient turns statistically insignificant once the effects of Chinese 
export competition are excluded from the sample.
16 This China effect seems to exert the 
most influence in SITC 7, where displacement effects become insignificant both at the 
one- and two-digit SITC levels once China is excluded.  
 
Price competition (FOC-price) 
  A second approach is to test for the existence of significant relative price effects 
on export demand, indicating a high degree of substitutability between manufactures 
produced in different developing nations. This requires estimating an export demand 
function in which, as discussed earlier, we distinguish relative prices or real exchange 
rates with the industrialized countries and with competing developing countries: 






it it u R b R b Z b b X + + + + = 3 2 1 0      ( 2 )  
where 
L
it R  = it
L
it P P /  is the relative price of manufactured exports from competing 
developing countries (measured by price index 
L
it P ) to home country exports of 
manufactures (with price index Pit),
17 uit is the error term and all other variables are 
defined as before. In this specification, the FOC-price hypothesis of strong substitution 
effects between developing country exports implies b3 > 0.  
  When estimating equation (2), in order to ensure that changes in export prices   14
reflect those of manufactured exports, only those developing countries for which 
manufacturing exports constituted at least 70 percent of total exports in at least one of 
two years, 1990 and 2001, were included in the sample. This gave us a sample of 18 
developing countries plus the 10 largest importing industrialized countries.
18 Although 
we could not obtain disaggregated price indexes for different types of exports, we were 
able to group the developing countries into several different panels according to their 
structural characteristics including their export composition (see Table 3). Some of these 
panels (country groups) were motivated more by considerations related to testing the 
FOC-growth hypothesis rather than FOC-price, but for the sake of consistency the same 
panels were used for both sets of estimates. 
[Table 3 about here] 
  The panel ‘ALL’ includes all 18 developing countries in the sample. We then 
classified any country with a trade share in GDP of greater than 50 percent and a GDP of 
less than US$100 billion in the SMALLOPEN panel and put all other countries in the 
LARGE panel. An alternative criterion that could be used to select the developing 
countries in the sample is manufactured exports measured as a percentage of GDP, rather 
than as a percentage of total exports. We therefore divide the panel into two sub-panels of 
countries that are above and below a 25 percent threshold for this indicator, referred to as 
HIMFRGDP and LOMFRGDP, respectively. We expect FOC-price effects to be stronger 
in the SMALLOPEN and HIMFRGDP panels compared with LARGE and LOMFRGDP, 
respectively. Another possible classification is one based on the nature of a country’s 
exports. We designated countries with 30 percent high technology exports or above in 
2000 as ‘high-technology’ (HITECH) exporters and those with less than 10 percent as   15
‘low-technology’ (LOTECH) exporters;
19 China and Mexico were included in both 
panels because of their intermediate status (they each had approximately 20 percent high 
technology exports in 2000 and in each case this share rose rapidly in the 1990s) and on 
the assumption that they compete with countries in both groups. We expect that the FOC 
hypothesis is more likely to apply to countries that are specialized in less technologically 
sophisticated, more ‘commoditized’ exports, such as textiles and apparel. Finally, we 
distinguish between countries based on their external debt-to-GDP ratios using a 33 
percent cut-off for the debt to GDP ratio, resulting in the two panels HIDEBT and 
LODEBT. This gives us a total of eight sub-panels consisting of more structurally 
homogeneous countries, as compared with the whole sample in the ALL panel. 
[Table 4 about here] 
  Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (2). As before, we used an 
ARDL(1,1) specification and all variables were measured in natural logarithms; long-run 
coefficients were calculated the same way as in Table 2.
20 In general, the results indicate 
that the developing country exporters in our sample mainly compete with each other, and 
not with domestic producers in the industrialized countries (this can be observed from the 
positive coefficients on R
L compared with the mostly negative coefficients on R
N in most 
of the panels shown in Table 4). The main exceptions are the LOMFRGDP and LOTECH 
panels. While we don’t have strong prior expectations about the LOMFRGDP panel, the 
negative sign for R
L for the LOTECH panel is contrary to our priors—we would have 
expected exporting developing countries specialized in low technology manufactures to 
face more competition from other developing countries, not less, as we originally found 
in Razmi and Blecker (2008). In that earlier article (in which the sample period covered   16
only 1983-2001), we found that the LOTECH countries mainly competed with other 
developing countries, while the HITECH countries mainly competed with industrial 
country producers. A result that is more consistent with expectations is that the 
expenditure elasticity (coefficient on Z
N) is highly positive and significant for the 
HITECH countries, but negative and statistically insignificant for the LOTECH countries. 
    
Output effects (FOC-growth) 
  To test for effects of intra-developing country competition in export markets on 
the growth of output, we estimate an econometric model that incorporates the same 
independent variables as in the export equation (2) but also controls for net financial 
inflows:
21 






it it v F c R c R c Z c c Y + + + + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
4 3 2 1 0     ( 3 )  
where  it Y ˆ  is the growth rate of real domestic output in country i at time t,  it F ˆ  is the 
growth rate of real capital inflows (measured as a percentage of GDP) into country i at 
time t and vit is the error term. All other variables are defined as before, except that ^’s 
are used to indicate growth rates (measured as log differences).  
  We expect the expenditure effect c1 and the financial inflows effect c4 to be 
positive, while the signs of the relative price (real exchange rate) effects c2 and c3 are 
theoretically ambiguous as they depend on the degree to which the products of different 
countries are substitutes. The FOC-growth hypothesis rests on the assumption that 
developing countries’ manufactured exports are close substitutes for each other, and that 
sales in the same industrialized country markets imply the possibility of mutual crowding 
out. Such crowding out can restrain the growth of exports and, in the presence of a   17
balance of payments constraint, the growth of output as well. If these effects are 
significant, we would expect c3 > 0, otherwise c3 ≤ 0.  
  This leaves the sign of c2, which is the effect of a real depreciation of the home 
currency relative to the industrialized countries’ currencies on the home country’s growth 
rate. Although we hypothesize that the substitution effects of relative price changes are 
likely to dominate other effects when developing countries devalue relative to each other, 
if developing country manufactures do not compete to a significant extent with 
industrialized country products, then other channels may assume added importance when 
developing nations devalue relative to industrialized countries.
22 For example, recent 
studies have emphasized balance sheet effects. If a developing country’s foreign debt is 
mostly denominated in industrialized country currencies, then a real devaluation relative 
to these countries could have a contractionary effect as the country suddenly has to 
scrounge for further resources to deal with the inflated debt burden. Also, many 
developing countries are dependent on industrialized countries for capital goods and 
equipment. A devaluation relative to those countries, by rendering these critical goods 
harder to buy, could have a negative impact on output. For these and other reasons, a real 
devaluation vis-à-vis industrialized countries may depress national income, as has been 
recognized in the large literature on contractionary devaluations.
23 In that case, c2 < 0, 
which (following Blecker and Razmi, 2008) we call the ‘COD’ (for contractionary 
devaluation) hypothesis. In the alternative case, c3 ≥ 0. 
  The estimates of equation (3) are summarized in Table 5, using the same panels of 
countries as in Table 4 (except that Hong Kong is omitted for lack of financial inflow 
data). The model is estimated in ARDL(1,1) form and only long-run coefficients are   18
reported in the table as before. The estimates in Table 5, however, use different price 
measures: instead of the export price indexes used in the regressions in Tables 2 and 4, 
the regressions in Table 5 use consumer price indexes to adjust nominal exchange rates in 
calculating real exchange rates (results using the export price indexes, which are 
generally similar but suffer from certain econometric problems, are reported in Blecker 
and Razmi, 2008). The results in Table 5 reveal significant COD effects (i.e., negative 
coefficients on 
N R ˆ ) in all of the panels shown and significant FOC-growth effects (i.e., 
positive coefficients on 
L R ˆ ) in most of them. FOC-growth effects are strongest for the 
SMALLOPEN and LOTECH panels, but they were also found to be statistically 
significant in most of the other panels. As expected (based on the balance sheet effects 
discussed above), COD effects are stronger in HIDEBT panel compared with LODEBT. 
The only anomaly in these results is the negative coefficient on 
L R ˆ  for the HIMFRGDP 
panel, which in principle might be expected to have a relatively strong FOC-growth 
effect. 
[Table 5 about here] 
  These findings suggest that the expanding group of developing countries that are 
pursuing an export-led growth strategy may face a dilemma. If any given exporting 
nation becomes more price-competitive in global export markets relative to competing 
developing nations (whether through a nominal currency depreciation, wage cuts, or 
other cost reductions), that country may obtain short-run growth benefits, but these are 
offset to the extent that its real exchange rate also depreciates relative to the industrialized 
countries at the same time. If other developing nations match the lower prices, then the 
competitive benefits vis-à-vis those nations are lost, while the contractionary effects of   19
the depreciation relative to the industrialized countries are then felt by all the developing 
countries involved. Also, if a rival developing country cheapens its exports of 
manufactures and the home country is unable to match this depreciation, the latter may 
experience a growth slowdown due to the FOC-growth effect (there will not be a COD 
effect in the home country in this situation).  
 
Conclusions and future prospects 
 
In a recent newspaper editorial, Dani Rodrik writes that ‘there are signs that we are at the 
cusp of the transition to a new regime in which the rules of the game will not be nearly as 
accommodating for export-led strategies’ (Rodrik, 2008). The reasons he cites for this 
prediction are the growth slowdown in the advanced economies associated with the 
financial crisis of 2007-8, the likely unwinding of global current account imbalances, and 
the threat of increased protectionism in the advanced countries. While these potential 
obstacles to future export-led growth are real, the research cited in this chapter shows that 
the export-led growth model already suffered from a significant internal contradiction 
even before these new problems arose. While such a model could work well for a small 
number of countries without too many competitors, such as the four Asian tigers in the 
1970s and 1980s, the diffusion of the model to a large number of countries in the 1990s 
and 2000s made it likely that together they would face an adding-up constraint or FOC. 
  The econometric estimates discussed in this chapter find evidence in support of 
three variants of the FOC hypothesis. First, we found evidence of significant quantitative 
displacement of manufactured exports from some developing countries by similar types   20
of exports from other developing countries. Second, we found that exports from different 
developing countries are strong substitutes for each other, in the sense that price 
competition over market shares in the industrialized countries enables the developing 
countries with relatively lower-priced exports to succeed at the expense of others. Third, 
and most strikingly, we found that developing countries obtain significant growth 
benefits by maintaining low real exchange rates relative to competing developing 
countries, in spite of the fact that real depreciations relative to the industrialized countries 
have contractionary effects. This suggests that the export-led growth model was not a 
panacea for many developing nations even under the more favorable global conditions 
that prevailed prior to 2008. 
  If industrialized country markets do not grow rapidly enough, even in prosperous 
times, to accommodate all of the desired increases in manufactured exports from the 
developing countries, one of the obvious solutions is to increase ‘South-South’ or intra-
developing country trade. Such trade has grown rapidly in recent years, especially in Asia 
(less so in other global regions). One recent study (Akin and Kose, 2008) finds that the 
more advanced emerging market nations have begun to ‘decouple’ from the 
industrialized nations in the sense that the impact of Northern economic activity (GDP 
growth) on the growth of what they call ‘the emerging South’ was reduced during the 
1986-2005 period compared with earlier years. Nevertheless, the impact of Northern 
growth on the emerging South economies remains positive and significant after 1986, 
implying that the latter countries are not immune from a growth slowdown in the North. 
Moreover, regionally disaggregated results show that this apparent (and partial) 
‘decoupling’ is found only in the Asia-Pacific region, while in Latin America and the   21
Caribbean the effect of Northern growth becomes larger and more significant after 1986, 
and for the ‘developing South’—i.e., the less developed nations—the effects of Northern 
growth remain strong and there is no structural break after 1986.
24 Thus, although the 
Asia-Pacific region has become relatively less dependent on Northern growth than in the 
past, it and all other parts of the ‘developing’ and ‘emerging’ South remain significantly 
constrained by the growth of their primary export markets, which continue to be located 
mainly in the advanced industrial economies. Finally, one should note that a significant 
part of South-South trade consists in the exchange of intermediate goods for further 
assembly, and to this extent Southern exports still depend ultimately on final consumer 
demand in the North (see Athukorala, 2008). 
  Our analysis thus leads inexorably to the conclusion that, for most developing or 
emerging nations, the path toward sustainable long-run development must emphasize 
internal markets and domestic demand much more than it has during the ascendancy of 
export-led strategies in the past few decades. Although those strategies produced several 
notable success stories in Asia, it does not appear feasible for all countries in the 
developing world to emulate their success—and if it was not feasible even during the 
years of relatively rapid global growth in the 1990s and mid-2000s, it will be even less so 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. Perhaps one of the few silver 
linings of the latter will be the impetus it may give to a rethinking of development 
strategy, in the direction of a better balance of internal and external sources of demand, 
rather than the extreme pendulum swings of the import-substitution and export-promotion 
eras. Such a redirection of development policy may also permit a return to growth with 
equity, as labor income becomes seen as a crucial element of aggregate demand and not   22
merely a cost to be minimized in the interest of external competitiveness.  23
Notes 
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1 See Razmi (2007b) and Razmi and Blecker (2008) for more detailed statistics. 
2 For surveys covering a wide range of studies see Blecker (2002, 2003), Mayer (2002), 
and Blecker and Razmi (2008). 
3 The idea of using US import data to calculate terms of trade for developing country 
exports is due to Maizels (2000). The data shown in this figure are not available prior to 
1991 on a comparable basis from the source used here. 
4 Of course, the implication that ought to have been derived is that real exchange rate 
overvaluations would constitute a beneficial development policy objective, but, as 
pointed out by Williamson (2008), this implication was seldom or never translated into a 
serious policy recommendation. 
5 See McCombie and Thirlwall (2004) for a collection of the main contributions. 
6 The extended model including capital mobility is presented in the unpublished 
theoretical appendix to Blecker and Razmi (2008), which is available from the authors on 
request. 
7 The result does not appear to hold for developed countries. 
8 Other papers that have recently explored the real exchange rate-growth nexus include 
Aguirre and Calderón (2005), Prasad et al. (2007), Johnson et al. (2007), Eichengreen 
(2007), Williamson (2008), Frenkel and Ros (2006), and Montiel and Serven (2008). 
9 These indexes use a dual weighting scheme previously utilized in Razmi and Blecker 
(2008) which, in spite of the common publication date, was written earlier. 
10 This literature originated with classic articles by Díaz-Alejandro (1963) and Krugman 
and Taylor (1978). For references to more recent literature as well as new empirical tests, 
see Razmi (2007a) and Blecker and Razmi (2008). It should be noted that the possibility 
of a devaluation being contractionary does not depend on short-run “J-curve” effects, in 
which the trade balance initially worsens and then eventually improves following a 
devaluation. Even if the J-curve eventually turns up and the trade balance improves, a 
devaluation can still be contractionary if the increase in the trade balance is offset by 
other consequences of the devaluation, such as the balance sheet effects discussed below. 
11 This section draws on the authors’ previously published findings in Razmi (2007b) and 
Blecker and Razmi (2008), and also presents updated and revised estimates similar to 
those in Razmi and Blecker (2008). For reasons of space, our discussion here is limited to 
the main panel data results. Readers are referred to the original articles for details of the 
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index construction, sample selection criteria, individual country estimates, and sensitivity 
tests. 
12 See Razmi (2007b) for the underlying theoretical specification of export demand that 
implies equation (1) as a method of testing for quantitative displacement. We ignore lags 
here in order to focus on the main motivation behind the specification; the lag structure is 
discussed below. 
13 The developing countries, which were chosen because of the relatively high percentage 
of manufactures in their exports, are: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea (Rep.), Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
The industrialized countries, which were chosen because of their size, are: Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US.  
14 Notice that SITC 7 is also the category in which the growth of global production 
networks and vertical intra-industry trade was the most rapid during this period. See, for 
example, Lall et al. (2004) and UNCTAD (2004). 
15 See Razmi (2007b) for complete results. 
16 Both the China effect and the importance of the US market as a locus of competition 
are corroborated by other recent studies. For example, Arnold (2008) finds that a large 
part of the increase in Chinese imports into the US has come at the expense of imports 
from other Asian countries, rather than US domestic products. However, Hanson and 
Robertson (2008) find only a small impact of Chinese exports on exports of other 
developing countries using a gravity model. Also, Wang and Wei (2008) find evidence of 
increasing similarity of Chinese exports to domestic products in the US and other 
advanced economies. 
17 See Razmi and Blecker (2008) and Blecker and Razmi (2008) for more details on how 
these price indexes were constructed and how the empirical model maps onto the 
theoretical framework alluded to in note 6, above. 
18 These 18 developing countries are Bangladesh, China, the Dominican Republic, Hong 
Kong, India, Jamaica, South Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey; the 10 largest 
industrialized countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
19 These panels largely correspond to the percentages of the countries’ exports in the four 
major SITC classifications for manufactures. Especially, the countries that export largely 
products in SITC 7, which includes electronics, computers, automobiles and other types 
of machinery and equipment, are all in the HITECH category. In contrast, the countries 
whose exports are mostly in SITC 6 (mainly textiles and steel) and 8 (mostly apparel and 
footwear) are all in the LOTECH group.  
20 Thus, the underlying specification is of a log-linear Cobb-Douglas form, which 
assumes that developing countries export products that are imperfect substitutes. 
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21 This empirical specification was used previously in Blecker and Razmi (2008) and is 
inspired by the theoretical models of Blecker (2002) and Razmi (2004), discussed earlier. 
22 See Razmi (2007a) and Blecker and Razmi (2008) for more detailed discussions of 
these other channels. 
23 Another reason is that a devaluation tends to redistribute income away from labor, 
thereby reducing consumer demand. See the sources cited in note 10, above. 
24 The countries included in Akin and Kose’s ‘emerging South’ are Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Morocco, and South Africa. These are largely the same countries we have included in this 
study as the developing nations most specialized in manufactured exports, with only a 
few exceptions (compare notes 13 and 18, above).    26
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Table 1. Average annual growth rates, selected countries and years 
 
 
 1980-89  1990-99  2000-07 
Asian newly industrialized 
economies (four tigers)
a  7.7 6.1 4.9 
China (People’s Republic)  9.7  10.0  10.0 
India 5.6  4.6  7.1 
Other emerging and developing 
economies specialized in 
manufactures
b  3.8 4.2 4.5 
Average for all emerging and 
developing economies 
(excluding the four tigers)  3.5  3.2  6.4 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2008 Database, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/index.aspx, and authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Notes: Averages are calculated using GDP at purchasing power parity as weights.  
 
a Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
 
b Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey. These are the twelve other 
countries, besides China, India, and the four tigers, for which manufactures constituted 
more than 70% of their merchandise exports in either 1990 or 2001.   32
Table 2. GMM estimates of export equation (1), tests for FOC-quantity. Sample period after lags and differences, 1987-2004 
 
Dependent Variable: Real exports, X 
Panel    ALL  SITC 5  SITC 6  SITC 7  SITC 8  SITC 65  SITC 75  SITC 77 SITC 84 SITC 85
Cross-Sections    22 22 22  22 22 22 22  22 22  22 
Total panel observations    390 390 390  390 390 390 388  390 390  390 
Long-run coefficients on:                 
N Z     2.383 -0.755 2.841 3.887 0.677* 1.244  5.240 3.412 3.219  -0.356 
    (0.004) (0.029 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.169) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.060) 
N R    
1.774 1.492 0.842  1.819 1.301 2.671 2.633  1.312 3.808  4.051 
    (0.081) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.005) (0.000)  (0.000) 
L X    
-0.699 1.257 -1.486  -0.791 -0.896 -1.657 -0.945  -0.561  -2.534  -3.174 
    (0.081) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.040) (0.000) (0.014)  (0.060) (0.003)  (0.000) 
                 
Sargan test (p-value)    0.589 0.497 0.545  0.367 0.610 0.561 0.525  0.357 0.737  0.784 
 
Source: Razmi (2007b), reproduced with permission. 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses, based on White period standard errors and variance (degrees of freedom corrected). Constants and lagged dependent variables 
were included in all equations. The reported coefficients are the ‘long-run’ coefficients, i.e., the sums of the current and one-year lagged variables divided by 
one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Second and third lags of the dependent variable and lagged instances of the regressors were used 
as instruments. Period SUR weighted matrices were used to correct for both period heteroskedasticity and general correlation of observations within cross-
sections. Orthogonal deviations were used to remove individual specific effects. The Sargan test is for the validity of overidentifying restrictions. SITC 65 
includes textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles and related products, SITC 75 includes office machines and automatic, data-processing machines, SITC 77 
includes electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, SITC 84 includes articles of apparel and clothing accessories, SITC 85 includes footwear.  
 
*Denotes variables that were not significant at the 10% level, but which were included based on Wald tests for joint exclusion.    33
 
Table 3. Countries included in the panels for testing FOC-price and FOC-growth  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ALL: Bangladesh, China, Dominican Republic, Hong Kong,
a India, Jamaica, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey 
 
SMALLOPEN (total trade share of GDP over 50% and GDP less than US$100 billion in 
2000): Dominican Republic, Hong Kong,
a Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia 
 
LARGE (total trade share of GDP under 50% or GDP greater than US$100 billion in 2000): 
Bangladesh, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey 
 
HIMFRGDP (ratio of manufactured exports to GDP greater than 25%): Hong Kong,
a Korea, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
 
LOMFRGDP (ratio of manufactured exports to GDP less than 25%): Bangladesh, China, 
Dominican Republic, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey 
 




b Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan 
 
LOTECH (share of high technology imports less than 10%): Bangladesh, China,
b Dominican 
Republic, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico,
b Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey 
 
HIDEBT (ratio of external debt to GDP greater than 33%): Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, 
Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey 
 
LODEBT (ratio of external debt to GDP less than 33%): China, Hong Kong,






a Hong Kong is omitted from all regressions in the tests of FOC-growth in Table 5, below, 
because of a lack of foreign capital inflow data prior to 1999, but it is used in the FOC-price 
tests in Table 4.  
 
b China and Mexico are included in both HITECH and LOTECH due to their intermediate 
status, with high technology shares around 20% and rising during the sample period. 
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Table 4. GMM estimates of export equation (2), tests for FOC-price. Sample period after lags and differences, 1987-2004 
Dependent Variable: (Logged value of) real exports,  X  
Panel ALL  SMALLOPEN LARGE HIMFRGDP LOMFRGDP HITECH LOTECH HIDEBT LODEBT
Cross-Sections Included  18  9  9  8  10  9  11  12  6 
Total panel observations  336  165  171  146  190  165  209  222  114 
Long-run coefficients on:  
N Z   0.780 0.383  1.124 1.879  -0.122  1.109  -0.137  0.199  0.527 
 (0.033) (0.148)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.458)  (0.492)  (0.000) 
N R   -0.730 -0.669 -0.764 -3.757 2.524 -4.024 2.523 0.215 -1.474
 (0.211) (0.355) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.756) (0.000)
L R   2.456 3.126 1.901 6.468 -1.562 4.918 -1.456 1.285 1.940
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.023) (0.000)
   
Sargan test (p-value) 0.105 0.568 0.771 0.809 0.386  0.327 0.233 0.276 0.699
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Notes: Same as for Table 2, except that the panels used here are the ones described in Table 3.  
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Table 5. GMM estimates of output equation (3), tests for FOC-growth and COD. Sample period after lags and differences, 1987-2004 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate (log difference) of real GDP, Y ˆ
Panel ALL  SMALLOPEN LARGE HIMFRGDP LOMFRGDP HITECH LOTECH HIDEBT LODEBT
Cross-Sections Included  17  8 9 7 10  8 11 12 5
Total panel observations  297  142 155 124 173  191 142 209 89
Long-run coefficients on:                
N Z ˆ   0.122 0.122  0.118  0.111  0.059  0.221 0.039 0.073  0.118 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.000) 
N R ˆ   -0.337 -0.376 -0.165 -0.301  -0.167  -0.121  -0.174  -0.272  -0.128 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
L R ˆ   0.165 0.202  0.134  -0.212  0.086  -0.093  0.110 0.105 -0.086* 
 (0.008) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.198) 
F ˆ   0.579 0.190  1.226  0.370  0.258  0.790 0.217 0.501  0.152 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
                  
Sargan test (p-value) 0.208  0.593  0.806  0.681  0.402  0.737  0.375  0.117  0.690 
 
Source: Blecker and Razmi (2008), reproduced with permission. 
 
Notes: Same as for Table 2, except that the panels used here are the ones described in Table 3. 
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Figure 1. Indexes of relative prices of manufactured goods imported by the US, annual averages, 1991 to 2007. Source: US 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Import Price Indexes, www.bls.gov, and authors’ calculations. Note: the price 
indexes are for manufactured imports only, except the index for the newly industrialized Asian countries is for total imports. 